

REMARKS

Claims 1-54 remain pending in the application. Reconsideration is respectfully requested in light of the following remarks.

Section 102(e) Rejection:

The Examiner rejected claims 1-54 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Kanevsky et al. (U.S. Patent 6,912,580) (hereinafter “Kanevsky”). Applicants respectfully traverse this rejection for at least the following reasons.

Regarding claim 1, contrary to the Examiner’s assertion, Kanevsky fails to teach or suggest *configuring preference values for one or more pluggable components on a first device*. The Examiner cites column 3, lines 4-11 of Kanevsky as teaching this limitation. The Examiner’s citation lists items that may be contained in a virtual briefcase, according to Kanevsky, but says nothing about preference values for one or more pluggable components on a first device. Note that claim 1 does not recite “simply any number or value” as the Examiner contends. Instead, claim 1 specifically recites *configuring preference values for one or more pluggable components on a first device*. Kanevsky does not describe *configuring* any number or value in the virtual briefcase. Furthermore, claim 1 does not recite configuring just any number or value. Instead, claim 1 recites configuring a specific type of value – values that pertain to *preferences for one or more pluggable components on a first device*. The portion of Kanevsky cited by the Examiner does not describe anything about configuring any numbers or values, much less configuring preference values for one or more pluggable components, as recited in claim 1. Moreover, when the entirety of claim 1 is considered, the preference values are further defined in the claim as pertaining to the execution of the one or more pluggable components, as further discussed below. Kanevsky teaches absolutely nothing about configuring preference values that pertain to the execution of one or more pluggable components.

Further regarding claim 1, Kanevsky fails to teach or suggest *the one or more pluggable components are executable within the one or more other devices in accordance with the configured preference values*. The Examiner cites column 2, line 19-34, as teaching this limitation. However, while this citation describes a client requesting and receiving application programs, and these applications executing on client devices, there is nothing in this citation that discloses these applications are executable in accordance with configured preference values, as recited in claim 1. In fact, there is no configurable information described anywhere in Kanevsky that effects the execution of a pluggable component.

Moreover, claim 1 recites that the one or more pluggable components are executable within the one or more other devices in accordance with the configured preference values that are configured for the one or more pluggable components on a first device. **Kanevsky clearly does not teach that the configuring of preference values for a pluggable component on one device effects the execution of a pluggable component on a different device.**

Applicants remind the Examiner that anticipation requires the presence in a single prior art reference disclosure of each and every limitation of the claimed invention, arranged as in the claim. M.P.E.P 2131; *Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co.*, 221 USPQ 481, 485 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as is contained in the claims. *Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co.*, 9 USPQ2d 1913, 1920 (Fed. Cir. 1989). As discussed above, Kanevsky fails to disclose *configuring preference values for one or more pluggable components on a first device and the one or more pluggable components are executable within the one or more other devices in accordance with the configured preference values*. Therefore, Kanevsky cannot be said to anticipate claim 1.

For at least the reasons above, the rejection of claim 1 is not supported by the cited art and removal thereof is respectfully requested. Independent claims 21, 35, and 45

include limitations similar to those in claim 1, and so the arguments presented above apply with equal force to these claims, as well.

Regarding claim 2, contrary to the Examiner's assertion, Kanevsky fails to teach or suggest *said configuring preference values for one or more pluggable components on a first device comprises: receiving user input to a graphical user interface of the first device; and modifying the preference values of a first of the one or more pluggable components in accordance with the received user input.* The Examiner again cites column 3, lines 4-11, as teaching these limitations. However, as discussed above regarding claim 1, this citation merely lists the types of applications that may be included in Kanevsky's virtual briefcase. It teaches nothing about configuring preference values for any of these applications, much less configuring them in the manner recited in claim 2. For example, Kanevsky fails to disclose receiving user input to a graphical user interface, or of modifying the preference values of one of the components in accordance with this user input.

For at least the reasons above, the rejection of claim 2 is not supported by the cited art and removal thereof is respectfully requested. Claims 22, 36, and 46 include limitations similar to those of claim 2, and so the arguments presented above apply with equal force to these claims, as well.

Regarding claim 3, contrary to the Examiner's assertion, Kanevsky fails to teach or suggest *displaying on the graphical user interface a current value of each of the preference values of the first pluggable component, wherein the received user input changes one or more of the displayed current values.* The Examiner again cites column 3, lines 4-11, as teaching this limitation. However, as discussed above regarding claims 1 and 2, this citation has nothing to do with configuring preference values, nor with displaying current values of preference values and changing them, as recited in claim 3.

For at least the reasons above, the rejection of claim 3 is not supported by the cited art and removal thereof is respectfully requested. Claims 22, 36, and 46 also

include the additional limitation of displaying and changing preference values, as recited in claim 3, and so the arguments presented above regarding claim 3 apply with equal force to these claims, as well.

Regarding claim 4, contrary to the Examiner's assertion, Kanevsky fails to teach or suggest *validating the received user input prior to said modifying the preference values*. The Examiner again cites column 3, lines 4-11, as teaching this limitation. However, as discussed above regarding claims 1 and 2, this citation has nothing to do with configuring preference values, nor with validating received user input prior to modifying preference values, as recited in claim 4.

For at least the reasons above, the rejection of claim 4 is not supported by the cited art and removal thereof is respectfully requested.

Regarding claim 5, contrary to the Examiner's assertion, Kanevsky fails to teach or suggest *receiving user input to a command line interface of the first device; and modifying the preference values of a first of the one or more pluggable components in accordance with the received user input*. The Examiner again cites column 3, lines 4-11, as teaching this limitation. However, as discussed above regarding claims 1 and 2, this citation has nothing to do with configuring preference values, nor with receiving user input to a command line interface and modifying preference values in accordance with the received user input, as recited in claim 5.

For at least the reasons above, the rejection of claim 5 is not supported by the cited art and removal thereof is respectfully requested. Claims 23, 37, and 47 include limitations similar to those of claim 5, and so the arguments presented above apply with equal force to these claims, as well.

Regarding claim 6, contrary to the Examiner's assertion, Kanevsky fails to teach or suggest *the received user input specifies one or more of the preference values of the first pluggable component and a new value for each of the specified preference values*.

The Examiner again cites column 3, lines 4-11, as teaching this limitation. However, as discussed above regarding claims 1 and 2, this citation has nothing to do with configuring preference values, nor with received user input specifying one or more of the preference values and a new value for each of the specified preference values, as recited in claim 6.

For at least the reasons above, the rejection of claim 6 is not supported by the cited art and removal thereof is respectfully requested. Claims 23, 37, and 47 also include limitations similar to those of claim 6, and so the arguments presented above apply with equal force to these claims, as well.

Regarding claim 7, contrary to the Examiner's assertion, Kanevsky fails to teach or suggest *validating the received user input prior to said modifying the preference values*. The Examiner again cites column 3, lines 4-11, as teaching this limitation. However, as discussed above regarding claims 1 and 2, this citation has nothing to do with configuring preference values, nor with validating received user input prior to modifying preference values, as recited in claim 7.

For at least the reasons above, the rejection of claim 7 is not supported by the cited art and removal thereof is respectfully requested.

Regarding claim 8, contrary to the Examiner's assertion, Kanevsky fails to teach or suggest *configuring preference values of one or more pluggable components on a first device comprises modifying one or more of the preference values of at least one of the one or more pluggable components*. The Examiner refers only to "virtual shadow briefcase – 106" in his remarks regarding this rejection. Applicants note MPEP 707.07(d), which requires that, in an Examiner's Action, the ground of rejection should be "fully and clearly stated". As the Examiner has failed to fully and clearly state his ground of rejection, the rejection of claim 8 is improper. Furthermore, the virtual shadow briefcase of Kanevsky and descriptions thereof do not teach configuring preference values for pluggable components, much less configuring them by modifying them, as recited in claim 8.

For at least the reasons above, the rejection of claim 8 is not supported by the cited art and removal thereof is respectfully requested.

Regarding claim 9, contrary to the Examiner's assertion, Kanevsky fails to teach or suggest *initializing each of the preference values of each of the one or more pluggable components to a default value for the preference value prior to said configuring*. The Examiner cites column 3, lines 11-23, as teaching this limitation as "This brief case virtual package can be located in computer processors and memories (servers) of large devices... This control server can contain all data for all users." However, this citation does not mention anything about preference values, initializing preference values or default values for preference values. In fact, a server containing "all data for all users" describes only where user data is stored and has nothing to do with a method or system for configuring or initializing preference values, as recited in Applicants' claims.

For at least the reasons above, the rejection of claim 9 is not supported by the cited art and removal thereof is respectfully requested. Claims 24, 38, and 48 include limitations similar to those of claim 9 and so the arguments presented above apply with equal force to these claims, as well.

Regarding claim 11, contrary to the Examiner's assertion, Kanevsky fails to teach or suggest *configuring preference values comprises modifying the preference values for each of the plurality of pluggable components for execution within a corresponding one of the plurality of devices*. The Examiner again cites column 3, lines 11-23 as teaching this limitation. However, as discussed above regarding claim 9, this citation describes only where user data is stored. It does not teach anything about modifying preference values for each of the pluggable components for execution on one of the devices, as recited in claim 11.

For at least the reasons above, the rejection of claim 11 is not supported by the cited art and removal thereof is respectfully requested. Claims 25, 39, and 49 include

limitations similar to those of claim 11 and so the arguments presented above apply with equal force to these claims, as well.

Regarding claim 15, contrary to the Examiner's assertion, Kanevsky fails to teach or suggest *each of the one or more pluggable components comprises a preferences file comprising the preference values associated with the pluggable component*. The Examiner again cites column 3, lines 11-23 as teaching this limitation. However, as discussed above regarding claim 9, this citation describes only where user data is stored. It does not disclose that this user data includes preferences files, much less that each of the pluggable components (Kanevsky's applications) includes a preferences file, as recited in claim 15.

For at least the reasons above, the rejection of claim 15 is not supported by the cited art and removal thereof is respectfully requested. Claims 29 and 42 include limitations similar to those of claim 15 and so the arguments presented above apply with equal force to these claims, as well.

Regarding claim 16, contrary to the Examiner's assertion, Kanevsky fails to teach or suggest *the preferences files are Java programming language Properties files*. The Examiner cites column 2, line 56 – column 3, line 30, "... programs for supporting Java applets etc.", as teaching this limitation. However, this citation does not disclose that any pluggable components (Kanevsky's applications) include Java programming language Properties files. Properties files are not programs for supporting Java applets, nor would they necessarily be present in a system that supports execution of Java applets on client devices.

For at least the reasons above, the rejection of claim 16 is not supported by the cited art and removal thereof is respectfully requested. Claim 30 includes limitations similar to those of claim 16 and so the arguments presented above apply with equal force to this claim, as well.

Regarding claim 19, contrary to the Examiner's assertion, Kanevsky fails to teach or suggest *the pluggable components are Java Archive (JAR) files*. The Examiner cites column 2, line 56 – column 3, line 30, "... programs for supporting Java applets etc.", as teaching this limitation. However, this citation does not disclose that the pluggable components themselves (Kanevsky's applications) are of this format (JAR files), nor would this be necessary in a system that merely supports execution of Java applets on client devices.

For at least the reasons above, the rejection of claim 19 is not supported by the cited art and removal thereof is respectfully requested. Claims 33, 43, and 53 include limitations similar to those of claim 19 and so the arguments presented above apply with equal force to these claims, as well.

Applicants also assert that numerous other ones of the dependent claims recite further distinctions over the cited art. However, since the rejection has been shown to be unsupported for the independent claims, a further discussion of the dependent claims is not necessary at this time.

Allowable Subject Matter:

Although the Examiner lists claims 13, 14, 27, 28, 41 and 51 as rejected, the Examiner also stated that these claims are objected to as being dependent upon a rejected base claim, but otherwise allowable if rewritten in independent form. Applicants assume that since the Examiner did not provide any reasons for rejecting these claims, the inclusion of these claims in the § 102(e) rejection was an error. In light of the above remarks, Applicants assert that claims 13, 14, 27, 28, 41 and 51 are allowable in their current form.

CONCLUSION

Applicants submit the application is in condition for allowance, and prompt notice to that effect is respectfully requested.

If any extension of time (under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136) is necessary to prevent the above-referenced application from becoming abandoned, Applicants hereby petition for such an extension. If any fees are due, the Commissioner is authorized to charge said fees to Meyertons, Hood, Kivlin, Kowert, & Goetzel, P.C. Deposit Account No. 501505/5181-46501/RCK.

Also enclosed herewith are the following items:

- ☒ Return Receipt Postcard
- ☐ Petition for Extension of Time
- ☐ Notice of Change of Address
- ☐ Other:

Respectfully submitted,



Robert C. Kowert

Reg. No. 39,255

ATTORNEY FOR APPLICANT(S)

Meyertons, Hood, Kivlin, Kowert, & Goetzel, P.C.
P.O. Box 398
Austin, TX 78767-0398
Phone: (512) 853-8850

Date: April 13, 2006